It has become common practice to estimate the response of asset prices to monetary policy actions using market-based measures as proxies for monetary policy shocks, such as the unexpected change in the federal funds futures rate. I show that because interest rates and market-based measures of monetary policy shocks respond simultaneously to all news and not simply news about monetary policy actions, estimates of the response of interest rates to monetary policy using such measures are biased. I propose a methodology that corrects for this "joint-response bias." The results indicate that when this bias is accounted for the response of Treasury yields to monetary policy actions is considerably weaker than previously estimated. JEL Classification: E40, E52
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Monetary policymakers and financial market participants are interested in knowing how market interest rates respond to Federal Reserve actions. Cook and Hahn (1989) were the first to estimate the response of Treasury yields to changes in the Fed"s target for the federal funds rate. Specifically, they regressed daily changes in various Treasury yields on changes in the target and found that Treasury rates across the maturity spectrum responded strongly and significantly to changes in the federal funds rate target during the period 1973-79.
Using Cook and Hahn"s event-study methodology for the period June 6, 1989, through February 2, 2000, Kuttner (2001) found a uniformly smaller response of Treasury rates to funds rate target changes. Noting that rates, especially longer-term rates, should only respond to unanticipated target changes, he suggested that the relative failure of Cook and Hahn"s methodology in the latter period was likely a consequence of their failure to differentiate between expected and unexpected target changes.
Following Rudebusch"s (1998) suggestion that federal funds futures rates provide a natural forecast of the Federal Open Market Committee"s (FOMC"s) target for the federal funds rate, Kuttner (2001) used the change in the federal funds futures rate on days when the funds rate target was changed as a proxy for the unexpected target change.
Since then, it has become common practice to estimate the response of interest rates and other asset prices to unanticipated monetary policy actions using market-based measures of unexpected monetary policy actions-federal funds futures rates, eurodollar deposit rates, the 3-month T-bill rate, and eurodollar futures rates (e.g., Hamilton, 2008; Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2007; Faust, Swanson, and Wright, 2004; Bomfim, 2003; Poole and Rasche, 2000; Poole, Rasche, and Thornton, 2002; and Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2002) .
A number of researchers (e.g., Rigobon and Sack, 2004; Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2005; and Craine and Martin, 2008) have recognized that if interest rates and the market-based measures of monetary policy shocks respond simultaneously to news from a variety of sources, and not only news about monetary policy actions, the estimated response of asset prices to monetary policy actions using market-based measures of monetary policy shocks will be biased and inconsistent. Rigobon and Sack (2004) note that the event study approach essentially assumes that essentially the only thing moving rates on days when there are policy actions is the surprise policy action. They propose to identify the effect of the policy action using a procedure called identification through heteroskedasticity. Specifically, they assume the variance of monetary policy shocks is larger on days when there are FOMC meetings and the Chairman"s semi-annual testimony than on other days. The methodology purposed here corrects without making arbitrary assumptions about when the variance of monetary policy shocks is large.
Specifically, it uses the market-based measure on all days as a latent variable to account for the relationship between assets prices and the market-based measure of monetary policy shocks on days when there are unexpected policy actions. The methodology permits one to identify the marginal effect of monetary surprises relative to nonmonetary shocks. The methodology is simple to employ and requires a simple identifying assumption. Moreover, it is easily modified to account for the effects of other events such as the market"s reaction to other headline news.
The results show that, when the joint-response bias is accounted for, the response of Treasury rates is considerably smaller than previously reported. For data prior to February 3, 2000, the marginal response of yields on Treasury securities with maturities of one year or less is about half of that obtained using the standard methodology, and those with maturities longer than a year there is no statistically significant response beyond the response to ambient news. For data after February 2, 2000, none of the Treasury rates respond significantly to unanticipated monetary policy actions.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 analyses the response of interest rates to news. Cook and Hahn"s (1989) event-study methodology and Kuttner"s critique and refinement of this methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 shows why market-based measures of monetary policy shocks yield biased estimates of the response of interest rates to monetary policy shocks. Section 5 presents a latentvariable methodology and compares the results using this and standard methodology. The conclusions are presented in Section 6.
The Response of Interest Rates to News
There have been any number of empirical investigations of the response of interest rates (or other assets prices) to headline news (e.g., Remolona and Fleming, 1999; Fleming and Remolona, 1999; and Bartolini, 2008) . Because the FOMC has been targeting the federal funds rate, much of this research has focused on news about monetary policy (e.g., Gürkaynak et al., 2005; and Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005) . Eventstudy research has focused on headline news events; however, interest rates and other asset prices respond to news from a wide variety of sources. Because this information is not easily identified, it is difficult if not impossible to associate a given response with a particular piece of news or event. I call such information ambient news.
This section analyzes the relationship between Kuttner"s (2001) Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) argue that federal funds futures rate measures of financial markets" expectations of monetary policy may be biased because of a risk premium. They find, however, that Kuttner"s (2001) measure appears to be relatively robust to risk premia in federal funds futures contracts, noting that "The difference-based measure may largely "difference out" risk premia that are moving primarily at lower, business-cycle frequencies" (Piazzesi and Swanson, 2008, p. 690). Aware that this measure could not be calculated on the first day of the month, Kuttner replaced 0 1 t fff with the 1-month-ahead federal funds futures rate on the last day of the previous month. He also noted that there were problems with this measure on the last few days of the month, so he used (3) Although the analysis presented here focuses on Kuttner"s federal funds futures rate policy shock measure, it applies to all market-based measures of monetary policy shocks used in the literature. Cook and Hahn (1989) 
Estimating the Response of Interest Rates to Monetary Policy Actions

The Joint-Response of Treasury Rates and Kuttner Shocks
It is easy to demonstrate that the estimate of the response to unexpected policy actions from equation (6) Treasury rates are the 3-and 6-month T-bill rates (tb3 and tb6) and the 1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, 10-, and 20-year Treasury bond yields (t1, t3, t5, t7, t10, and t20). The second column of Some might suggest that because the FOMC was targeting the funds rate, the federal funds futures rate should only respond to surprise monetary policy actions. This suggestion ignores the fact that there was considerable uncertainty about the extent to which the FOMC was targeting the funds rate and the precise level of the funds rate target during much of the June 6, 1989 -February 2, 2000, sample period. This uncertainty diminished over time; however, as discussed below, the uncertainty was not completely resolved until February 2000. Thornton (2006a) shows that although the FOMC effectively returned to a funds rate operating procedure in September 1982, officially, the FOMC maintained it was targeting borrowed reserves. 6 Indeed, until the mid-1990s, the FOMC remained ambiguous about the extent to which it was targeting the funds rate. For example, at the conclusion of its February 1994 meeting, when the FOMC began the practice of announcing policy actions, the funds rate was not mentioned. The The large daily differences of the funds rate from the target are also reflected in monthly average data presented in Figure 2 . Prior to 2000 the monthly average difference was 5 basis points or larger for one-third of the months. In contrast, differences this large occurred for only 3.0 percent of the months from 2000 on. Given this uncertainty and the fact that the funds rate could deviate significantly from the FOMC"s target, it is not difficult to understand why the federal funds futures rate might also respond to news that would affect interest rates more generally.
After 2000, the market not only knew the precise level of the FOMC"s funds rate target, but Chairman Greenspan frequently signaled the magnitude of the next target change. Given the relatively small daily and monthly average differences between the funds rate and the target after 2000, it seems unlikely that Kuttner shocks on days when the target was unchanged would reflect information other than the market"s expectation of a change in the target.
The Joint-Response Bias
This section shows why the estimate of from equation (6) is biased when the market-based proxy for unexpected policy actions responds to ambient news. To see why, let * u t ff denote the unexpected target change, which is strictly unobservable, and fff denote the market-based proxy for the unexpected target change. Now assume that the market-based measure response to ambient news ( t N ) and the unexpected target change,
i.e.,
where and denote the response of the market-based measure to ambient news and unexpected target changes, respectively, and t v denotes an idiosyncratic shock to the market-based measure. Now assume that the interest rate of interest also responds to ambient news and unexpected target changes, i.e., Indeed, the estimate of could be nonzero even if the Fed"s action was fully anticipated,
i.e., 0 . Note that this bias arises because, while the ambient news shocks and unexpected monetary policy shocks are orthogonal, the response of the market-based policy measure at the daily frequency reflects the response to both shocks and not simply the monetary policy shocks. Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) propose dealing with the joint-response bias by using data are measured over a time interval that is sufficiently short that it is "much less likely that any other significant events took place within this narrow window that might have influenced asset prices." 13 Using extremely high-frequency data significantly reduces, if not eliminates, the joint-response bias; however, the estimated response using this data might overstate the effect of Fed actions on interest rates over the day. For example, Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) note that 12 Estimates from equation (6) could also suffer from simultaneous equation bias. For example, for a period during the early 1990s the funds rate target was changed shortly after the Bureau of Labor Statistics released the employment report, igniting speculation that the FOMC was responding to the employment report. 13 Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2007) , p. 60.
Correcting for the Joint-Response Bias
The Federal Reserve"s announcement following its January 28, 2004, policy meeting led to one of the largest reactions in the Treasury market on record, with two-and five-year yields jumping 20 and 25 basis points (bp) respectively in the half-hour surrounding the announcement-the largest movements around any Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcement over the fourteen years for which we have data.
Although the immediate reaction to this announcement was exceptional, the changes in these rates over the day were much less so. The daily changes in these rates were 17 and 15 basis points, respectively. Daily changes in other Treasury rates were smaller; for example, the 10-and 20-year yields changed by 11 and 10 basis points, respectively. These daily changes are not particularly unusual: On 267 days of the sample (6 percent) the 10-year Treasury yield changed by 11 basis points or more and on 135 days the 5-year yield changed by 15 basis points or more. Consequently, using extremely high-frequency data may
give a distorted picture of the extent to which interest rates respond to monetary policy shocks on the day. Moreover, most of the event-study literature has used daily data, which is more readily available.
Alternatively, Rigobon and Sack (2004) and Craine and Martin (2008) use a methodology that relies on the variance-covariance matrix to achieve structural identification in a simultaneous equation setting. However, the procedure relies on relatively strong assumptions about the relative variance of monetary policy shocks to other shocks. In contrast, the procedure described below only requires that all interest rates to news on all days regardless of whether there are monetary policy surprises or other headline news-an assumption that is easily verified.
The joint-response bias exists because interest rates and market-based monetary policy shock measures respond to all information relevant to interest rates. Hence, it is necessary to account for this bias in order to identify the effect of surprise monetary policy actions on interest rates. This can be done by using the market-based measure of a monetary policy shocks as a latent variable that accounts for the market"s reaction to ambient news. Specifically, it can be achieved by estimating (6), i.e., it is an estimate of the joint-response bias.
The Response of Treasury Rates to Monetary Policy Shocks
The initial investigation of the effect of the joint-response bias uses Kuttner"s Table 1 reveals that there are a small number of unusually large
Kuttner shocks during the sample period. Specifically, there were 26 shocks that were 30 basis points or larger in absolute value; however, one of these occurred on a day when the target was changed. 14 All but one of the remaining 25 unusually large shocks occurred early or late in the month, tended to be clustered, and were not associated with unusually large changes in Treasury rates (see Appendix B for details). These characteristic suggest that these unusually large Kuttner shocks are idiosyncratic to the federal funds futures market. Given these facts and the sensitivity of ordinary least squares estimates to extreme observations, these 25 unusually large Kuttner shocks were excluded from the sample.
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The analysis begins by estimating Kuttner"s (2001) of the 3-and 6-month T-bill rates are much larger than those obtained by Cook and Hahn (1989) and the estimates decline monotonically as the term to maturity lengthens.
14 This occurred on July 2, 1992. 15 The qualitative conclusions are robust to whether these observations are included or excluded. 16 The Kuttner shocks on days when the funds rate target changed used here differ on a few occasions from those used by Kuttner (2001) . The differences are twofold. First, the dates of target changes are from Thornton (2006a) , and differ from Kuttner"s on three days. There were also six days when the values are different, apparently because of differences in the futures rates used here and those used by Kuttner (2001) . Appendix A shows the Kuttner shocks used here and Kuttner"s (2001) shocks. In any event, these small differences are not important for the qualitative results presented here. 17 The covariance matrix for this and all other equations reported in this paper were obtained using a heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator.
The effect of the joint-response bias is investigated by estimating equation (11).
The estimates, presented in Table 3 , show that sum of the estimates of n and mps for each rate is somewhat smaller than the corresponding estimate of 1 in Table 2 ; however, the null hypothesis 1ˆn mps cannot be rejected at any reasonable significance level for any of the eight rates. Consistent with the joint response to ambient news, estimates of n are positive and highly statistically significant for all rates. In contrast, estimates of mps are statistically significant only for Treasuries with maturities of one year or less.
For maturities beyond one year, there is no statistically significant effect of a surprise target change beyond the joint response to ambient news. Moreover, estimates of 1 from equation (12) are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding estimates of mps , reflecting the upward bias in estimates of policy shocks that can arise from using market-based measures of monetary policy shocks.
Ambient News or Expectations of Future Target Changes?
The analysis in Section 4 suggests several reasons why the relationship between the federal funds futures rate and Treasury rates on days when there not changes in the funds rate target is a consequence of the market"s reaction to ambient news. Nevertheless, the possibility that this relationship reflects expectations of future target changes is investigated in two ways. First, several analysts (e.g., Rudebusch, 1998; Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; and Gürkaynak et al., 2007) have suggested the possibility that the FOMC responded to the employment report. Moreover, there is evidence that the bond market responds to "headline" economic announcements (e.g., Fleming and 1999; and Balduzzi et al., 2001 Estimates of Equation (13) are presented in Table 4 . Only the estimates of n , hl , and mps are presented, along with the summary statistics. Estimates of hl are positive for all eight interest rates; however, the estimates are not statistically significant at the short end of the yield curve, where the effect of a surprise target change is relatively large and statistically significant. Hence, it is difficult to interpret the statistically significant estimates of hl for maturities of three years or longer as being caused by expectations of future target changes. Importantly, the estimates of mps differ only slightly from those reported in Table 3 .
The second investigation is motivated by the FOMC"s asymmetric policy directive. From 1983 through 1999 the FOMC"s policy directive contained language widely thought to indicate the likelihood of a policy action before the next regularly scheduled FOMC meeting. 18 The directive was said to be symmetric if the directive indicated that tightening or easing were equally likely in the future and asymmetric otherwise. Evidence indicates that intermeeting policy actions occurred more frequently and were somewhat larger under an asymmetric policy directive, (e.g., Thornton and Wheelock, 2000) The symmetry of the FOMC"s policy directive was known when the FOMC minutes where released. During this period the minutes were released about two to three weeks after the next FOMC meeting. Consequently, as a general rule, market participants did not know the symmetry of the policy directive that was operational at the time.
However, Belongia and Kliesen (1994) Estimates of equation (14) are present in Table 5 . Estimates of lk are negative for maturities of one year or less and positive for maturities of more than one year.
However, the only estimate that is statistically significant is for the 3-month T-bill rate.
As with headline news, none of the estimates of mps is significantly different from those reported in Table 3 . The results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the idea that estimates of n are the consequence of the joint-response of Treasury rates and the federal funds futures rate to ambient news, rather than the response to changing expectations of the FOMC"s funds rate target.
The Response to Monetary Shocks Since 2000
By 2000 the FOMC funds target rate was well known. So too was the FOMC"s practice of changing the target at regularly scheduled meetings, except in unusual circumstances and Chairman Greenspan"s practice of frequently signaling target changes a few days in advance of the meeting. Consequently, there were fewer surprise target changes than during the prior sample period. This is reflected in the Kuttner shocks on days when the funds rate target was changed, which are presented in Table 6 . With the exception of the three intermeeting target changes that occurred January 3, April 18, and It is also the case that there were 13 days when the absolute value of the shock was greater than or equal to 20 basis points on days when the target was not changed. As during the earlier sample period, these unusually large Kuttner shocks tended to occur toward the beginning or end of the month and were not generally associated with large changes in the Treasury rates. Moreover, six occurred after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in Table 7 . The estimates of 1 are much smaller than those reported in Table 2 : Estimates of 1 for Treasury rates with maturities from 3 months to 1 year are about half as large as those for the prior sample period. Moreover, estimates of the response of Treasury"s with maturities longer than a year are statistically insignificant different from zero, suggesting that surprise policy actions had no significant effect on longer-term yields.
20 See Thornton (2006b) for a discussion of the "measured pace" language.
Estimates of equation (11) are presented in Table 8 . All of the estimates of n are positive and highly statistically significant, indicative of the joint response of Treasury rates and Kuttner shocks to ambient news. As before, estimates of the response of Treasury rates to monetary policy shocks from equation (12) are essentially the sum of n and mps from equation (11). However, none of the estimates of mps is statistically significant at the 5 percent level except that for the 20-year Treasury yield, which is negative. The negative estimate suggests that the 20-year yield might reflect a revision of long-term inflation expectations.
The strong and statistically significant relationship between Kuttner shocks and changes in Treasury rates on days when there were no policy actions might be surprising
given that the FOMC"s funds rate target was well known and target changes principally occurred at FOMC meetings. These facts would seem to suggest that the federal funds futures rate should respond only to unexpected policy actions and not to ambient news. It is important to remember that while the daily and monthly average deviations of the federal funds rate from the funds rate target were significantly smaller after early 2000, they were not zero (see Figures 1 and 2) . Moreover, as noted in Table 1 , the strength of the relationship between Kuttner shocks and changes in Treasury yields is essentially independent of the size of the Kuttner shock. Hence, ambient news could effects both the futures rate and Treasury rates in much the same way as during the prior period, even though the absolute value of the effects was small.
Nevertheless, knowledge of the FOMC"s funds rate target and when the target was most likely to change appears to have affected the estimate of the response of Treasury rates to ambient news. Given the FOMC"s targeting procedure, it is unlikely that market participants would revise their expectation of a target changes daily.
Consequently, the response of the federal funds futures rate to ambient news should be muted relative to the response of market rates. This is illustrated in Figure 3 
Ambient News or Expectations of Future Target Changes?
The result that surprise policy actions had little or no effect on Treasury rates could also occur if target changes were anticipated. To investigate this possibility, equation (11) Tables 7 and   8 , suggesting that the result may not be due solely to the fact that policy actions were anticipated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that only 7 of the 16 monetary policy shocks during this sample period were 10 basis points or larger. Consequently, it is difficult to draw any firm conclusion about the extent to which the results over this period were affected by better expectations of funds rate target adjustments.
Conclusion
Following Kuttner"s (2001) 
